Introduction
Heretofore, analysts have argued that one characteristic of mobilization in China is to provide uniformity in policy direction. This paper sets out to demonstrate that, in at least the public health area, a diverse set of public policies was pursued even in a period as apparently " radical " as the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). The reason for this policy diversity is that different segments of health policy were made in different political arenas, or institutional settings; the pressures, perceptions and resources which characterized one of these political arenas did not necessarily characterize another.' The " failures " of the Leap did not simply arise from a ubiquitous " radical " assertion of power but, on the contrary, resulted from the inconsistencies in leadership and programme characteristic of diverse policy-making arenas. Because policy-making responsibility is divided among political arenas, political bargaining and conflict have characterized the allocation to them of different health issues; elaborate strategies have been devised by organizations in order to acquire and/or hold certain areas of policy and unburden themselves of others.
A four-stage analysis develops this case: (1) how diverse were Great Leap policies? (2) Which health issues were placed in which political arenas and (3) what was the political process by which these issues were allocated among policy-making arenas? (4) What were the characteristics of each political arena and what impact did these peculiarities have on subsequent policy?
The implications of this approach are several, but two points may be anticipated. First, this approach suggests that one major point of contention in Chinese politics is the battle over which organization comes to, or has to, make policy. The second implication is that if different aspects of health policy are allocated to various arenas through a political process, then there will be difficulties in achieving administrative co-ordination; the actions taken in one policy arena may conflict with those taken in another.2 I will argue in this article that the difficulties of the Leap derived as much from the fragmentation of the policy-making process as from its dogmatism.
Finally, one must also ask whether medical policy-making is in some sense sui generis. Can concrete findings in this specific area be generally applied to all modes of policy-making in China? Some important reasons exist for thinking that health policy-making processes are not absolutely "typical," though almost all fields are "atypical" in some respect. First of all, until recently doctors in China have been somewhat independent of strict Party political control." One interviewee noted: Doctors and nurses were left pretty much to themselves without any form of interference from their school authorities or any other outside authority. Respondent said it was like being on an island apart from everyone, and it was a strange feeling to have no one controlling them.4
Secondly, it is very hard to know what the actual content of political supervision in medical affairs is, or could be. How can a Party cadre prevent favouritism in drug distribution, or prevent drug waste, if he does not know about pharmaceuticals? As we shall see, there has been a consistent trend for medical doctors to dominate the Ministry of Public Health (Weishengpu). Thirdly, because so many Party cadres are entitled to " free medical care " (kung-fei yi-liao), they also have an interest in the maintenance of quality services; their interests as patients are not totally in conflict with the interests of physicians trained in western practices. In short, the patterns of health politics during the Great Leap are not necessarily duplicated in all other policy areas; the extent of similarity remains to be demonstrated through empirical research.
The Diversity of Great Leap Health Policy, 1958-60
Medical policy is an interesting case study to examine because it did not move in any uniform "ideological" or "mobilizational" direction as the cyclical model would lead us to expect.5 "Health care " consists of at least six sub-issues: medical education, medical research, the structure of the health care delivery system, health care financing, traditional medicine and mass campaigns. In addition, one could add birth control, industrial safety, environmental protection and product inspection, though these will not be discussed here.
Policy for each of the six sub-issues during the Great Leap moved in a diversity of directions, no matter which dichotomy one uses: radical/ conservative, mass/elite, or urban/rural. Some policies changed dramatically and others hardly at all. During periods such as the Great Leap Forward, the mass media tend to become saturated with articles and broadcasts focussing attention on areas of substantial change. As a consequence of this focus, the outside observer often ignores the substantial degree of policy continuity which may exist in a decidedly "radical period." Medical Education. In 1958, Chairman Mao issued a directive on education in which he said: "Education must serve proletarian politics and education must be combined with productive labor ... the period of schooling should be shortened, education should be revolutionized."' While the number of middle-level doctors (trained for three years) being produced annually was increased by 50-75 per cent during the Great Leap,' higher level medical education was lengthened from five to six years in Peking Medical College, Tientsin Medical College and Shanghai First Medical School in the first months of 1959; in China Medical University, the length of the curriculum was extended to eight years.8 Premier Chou En-lai made this policy explicit by saying:
Full-time regular schools at all levels should make it their constant and fundamental task to raise the quality of teaching and studying; in the first place we must devote relatively more energy to perfecting a number of key schools so as to train specialized personnel of higher quality for the state and bring about a rapid rise in our country's scientific and cultural level [emphasis added].9
In short, while the vocal thrust of the Great Leap Forward consisted in reducing the length of education, important medical schools were moving in precisely the opposite direction.
Medical Research. One area of medicine which Mao and Party political cadres had strenuously denounced from 1949 on was the professionalism (sectarianism) of elite medical doctors -their overemphasis on "exotic" medical research. If the actual thrust of research policy had conformed to verbal declarations, the indicators of professionalism (e.g. substantive conferences and trips abroad) would have declined and the number of "exotic" research articles appearing in major medical journals would have dropped. In reality, however, research policy appears to have been something quite different. A possible inference from the above data is that medical research went on relatively "normally" during the Great Leap and that bureaucrats in the Ministry of Public Health and the Chinese Medical Association simply varied the rate of publication according to the fluidity of the external political environment. One seems to be seeing an insulated research apparatus trying to protect itself; this sensitizes the analyst to bureaucratic political strategies in China.
Corroborating this analysis is the fact that major advances in brain and heart surgery (along with bum research and the transplantation of severed limbs) were made during this period.13 As the minister of health, Li Te-ch'uan, noted in April 1959: "... certain previously weak links in medical science have been strengthened. For instance, heart surgery and brain surgery have developed considerably." 14 We conclude, then, that the "ideological" tone of the Great Leap did not seriously impair high-level professional work; research activities maintained continuity with past practices.
Health Care Delivery. The discussion of the two issue areas above should only alert us to divergent policy directions during the Leap; it 11. In this discussion of the sequence of national level meetings we are fortunate in having recently acquired a compendium of Mao's speeches at these gatherings. 13. See, for example, Joshua Horn, Away With All Pests (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), Chapter 11. An ambiguity arises in our discussion of burn research and the rejoining of severed limbs. Certainly the treatment of these two traumatic problems is expensive, requires large capital investments, and the rate of recovery to the point that the individual is once again productive is low. In a society with as few resources as China a real question arises as to whether or not this is the optimal investment of each health yiian. On the other hand, because China is at a relatively early stage of industrialization, burns and traumatic amputations are extremely common. The Chinese argue, however, that restoring one worker to a productive life makes the costs worthwhile.
14. Li Te-ch'uan, " Placing health undertakings at the service of production," CB, No. 577, p. 20. Minister Li delivered this address to the first session of the Second National People's Congress, April 1959.
should not lead us to conclude that no significant departures in any aspect of health care occurred. Health delivery policy underwent substantial change. The analysis of this issue area must be broken into its rural and urban dimensions because the Ministry of Health maintained jurisdiction over the latter while the myriad of Commune Party Committees assumed control of health delivery policy below the county level.
When the communes were launched in late 1958, the expectation was that China's 50,000 " united clinics " (lien-ho chen-suo) would be amalgamated into collectively-run commune health centres; " united clinics " were free-for-service group practices. The new commune clinics were run by Commune Party Committees; Party cadres attempted to use free medical care as an inducement to peasants to participate in the communization movement itself."' The scope and quality of any given commune clinic was reflective of local ionditions and decisions."1 The enthusiasm of local cadres in the 1958-59 period produced an emphasis on the free aspects of health care. In short, the basis of the Great Leap in sub-hsien health facilities was increased health service availability, "free medical care" and politics in command.
The question of what the Leap really meant in terms of rural health delivery deserves more attention than it can be given here, but I must note that communes did not really change the quality of health care in rural areas or the people who were giving that care. United clinics, which were generally staffed by traditional doctors, were taken over by the communes and collectively financed. Unlike during the Cultural Revolution, there was no massive permanent transfer of medical personnel to rural areas. In short, commune members were being asked to share the burden of supporting largely local personnel. When economic problems arose, commune members had to ask whether the expense of these clinics was worthwhile. Many said not."7
In urban areas, the Ministry apparatus was in charge (down to the urban ch'ii) and its basic organizational form was the " sectional medical service." This programme was an attempt to reduce demand on ch'ii and municipal hospitals by more tightly regulating the referral of cases to them. Each urban hospital was responsible for the health conditions in all units which had health care contracts with that particular institution. The district hospital periodically sent doctors to production units to decide which cases warranted referral.'8 A major objective of this arrangement was to reduce the flow of patients to higher level health facilities: " ... rational adjustments of medical service contracts and In the communes, each health centre was supposed to be financially independent of higher administrative units. There were two basic types of commune financial plan. Under the first type, the production brigades were to establish a welfare fund consisting of revenues from brigade enterprises and agricultural production. In addition, each brigade received a set sum from the commune welfare fund (pao-kan yi-liao).21 This brigade fund directly paid for all brigade members using health facilities. In the second type of financial plan, the commune welfare fund directly paid for all commune members.22 As these plans were initially conceived in 1958 and 1959, no direct costs were placed on the patient. This changed in May 1960 when widespread crop difficulties washed out the financial underpinnings of this system.23 Certainly, however, the concept of "free" medical care, of any kind, was unprecedented in the history of China's hinterland.
In urban areas financial arrangements hardly changed and a large majority of the urban population remained without comprehensive protection."2 While full labour force and insurance statistics are unavailable for 1959, at the end of 1958, out of a total non-agricultural labour force of 56-9 million, 13-8 million persons had labour insurance and 6-9 million had health insurance '"; about 12 per cent of China's non-agricultural work force was fully covered under industrial health programmes. The non-agricultural work force excludes children and the elderly. Offsetting some of these corrections, however, is the fact that government workers, cadres, military personnel and some students were covered for medical costs. In short, while we do not know exactly how many urban dwellers were covered under various health plans, it is hard to see how the number could have exceeded 25 per cent of the total urban population. 26 The Chinese, even in the most frenzied moments of the Great Leap, never claimed to have greatly expanded health insurance and it must be presumed they did not. Once again, we have seen a striking contrast between financial policies as they were drawn up in rural areas by Party Committees and in urban areas administered by the bureaucratic apparatus. to be resurrected and put into effect in March 1959."• To distil the argument, even in a "radical" period such as the Leap, the westernstyle research apparatus managed to insulate itself from the major excesses of the Leap and acquire additional areas of responsibility.
Mass Campaigns. The final policy area to be considered is that of mass health campaigns. One's expectations for significant policy departures are thoroughly met in this area of policy; this was because new institutions had been established almost entirely outside the health bureaucracy. In late 1955, the Central Committee, at Chairman Mao's behest, set up a special Nine Man Sub-committee on Schistosomiasis, with K'o Ch'ing-shih as its chairman and Wei Wen-po as the second in command. The sub-committee's initial responsibility was to eliminate schistosomiasis in the provinces of the Yangtse Basin.
At first, the sub-committee solicited expert opinion and, at its March 1956 meeting, a seven-year plan to eradicate schistosomiasis was unveiled.3" The first two years of the plan were allocated for a study of the problem itself, the following three years for the elimination of the disease, with the last two years left for mopping up operations. In the two-year study phase, substantial numbers of individuals were treated by paramedics trained under Party auspices.3 As might have been anticipated, the Weishengpu resisted this diminution of its authority: ". . reactionary bourgeois authorities -and doctors deeply influenced by them -maintained that the countryside was not equipped for safe treatment and advocated that the emphasis should be on opening regular modern hospitals in the county towns.... " 36 Despite these jurisdictional problems, however, experts did have some impact on sub-committee decisions during the period from 1956 to early 1958; the seven-year plan represented their relatively " go slow " approach.
In five major parasitic diseases was now to be accomplished. The five diseases to be tackled were malaria, filariasis, ancylostomiasis, kala azar and schistosomiasis: "The extent and scope of the work and the results so far achieved may be gauged from the proposal at the conference that we strive to achieve by next year basic eradication of the five major parasitic diseases." " Subsequently (until early 1960), the mass movement forged ahead with millions of peasants being mobilized to destroy disease vectors; the Ministry of Health and local health bureaux were largely irrelevant to this campaign. 40 Separate aspects of health policy thus moved in quite different directions. The uniformly "radical" tone of the Leap was more an artifact of media coverage than characteristic of actual policy outputs. Furthermore, essentially three different agencies produced health policy during the Leap: the Ministry of Health and its subordinate units, the Nine Man Sub-committee on Schistosomiasis (and subordinate local Party Committees at the province, hsien and ch'ii levels),41 and Commune Party Committees. The important consequence of this dispersion of policy-making authority is that in order to understand the shape of any given facet of policy we must understand the arena from which it emerged. Each arena affords different degrees of access to different interests, reflects different political constraints, makes particular political and social resources available, and generates policy with particular attributes. To understand the entire health policy constellation we must understand all three policy arenas (their leadership, supportive values, perceptions and resources) and the way that these arenas interacted. However, before discussing the characteristics of these agencies of health policy, I will tackle the question of how and why particular issues were "assigned" to particular arenas.
The Allocation of Health Issues
The Weishengpu. Quite simply, the Ministry of Public Health is a great residual arena. That is, it deals with all health issues unless they are appropriated from it by higher authorities and placed in an alternative arena, or unless the Ministry is faced with an issue which it finds impossible to handle (e.g. sub-hsien curative services). The territory under the Ministry's authority was defined in August 1950 at the First National Health Conference, and included responsibility for medical education, medical research, personnel questions, traditional medicine and health delivery. The Ministry's pre-eminence in the field was bureaucracy and create new organizations to deal with tasks which it felt were being neglected (a story to which I shall soon turn). Nonetheless, it took a positive action by a higher authority to remove an issue from the Ministry. Two considerations, however, limited this formal policy responsibility. First, many health issues involved other large agencies such as the Commercial and Chemical Ministries, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the All China Federation of Trade Unions. As a consequence, to discharge its responsibilities, the Weishengpu had to gain the co-operation of these other agencies. In short, the Ministry was not a hermetically sealed institution. The second constraint was, and is, represented by the General Line of the Party Centre and specific instructions which the Ministry periodically (and quite often) receives from Mao."4 Both the higher Party organs and Mao represent limits on the Ministry.
In the Great Leap Forward, only two broad policy responsibilities were concretely removed from the Ministry arena: anti-parasite work and commune health care. Responsibility for medical education (at the higher level), medical research, and health financing in urban areas remained under Weishengpu jurisdiction. In fact, the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee 4" explicitly acknowledged that the Ministry was to continue to administer the hospital system. Chou En-lai, a year later, instructed the Ministry to increase the attention given to higher level medical education and research. work, said that "... there have also been many defects in this work. In some areas, there was a lack of understanding of the stupendous and complicated nature of the task, and this gave rise to a feeling of hastiness and of an inclination to belittle the enemy." 46 The belief that the Ministry fought attempts to remove mass anti-parasite work from its jurisdiction is strengthened by subsequent denunciations:
Certain bourgeois experts were skeptic [sic] about the plan of setting a time limit for eradicating parasitic diseases. . . . They would further cite the fact that the Japanese had made a study of schistosomiasis for some twenty years and all their irrigation canals were built with cement, but even they, with their few endemic areas, had not succeeded in eradicating the disease. They did not believe in Party leadership . . they considered the Party "unskilled" and not able to lead the "skilled. The Commune Health Centres. In the above discussion, we have seen that one way in which new political arenas arise is through one sector of the political system " grabbing" an issue and constructing an apparatus to " process " it. The creation of the commune health arena was somewhat different, although any interpretation must remain tentative in the absence of complete documentation for the August 1958 Peitaiho Conference which sanctioned the widespread construction of people's communes.51 Before probing the subject in depth, however, one can say that the Ministry did not want responsibility for sub-hsien (commune) curative facilities. The Ministry preferred to concentrate limited funds in the county hospitals, thinking that this would be the optimal level for maintenance of quallity services and their geographic distribution. The Ministry's view was that if commune hospitals were to be built, someone else was going to have to do it. While the Weishengpu had resisted its loss of responsibility in anti-parasite work in 1955 and 1956, it felt that trying to build thousands of commune health centres was a burden it could do without.
Just as the Ministry reacted to this issue differently than it had to the 1955 decisions relating to anti-parasite work, so the Centre was less united than it had previously been. While the information on this is thin, later charges assert that Liu Shao-ch'i opposed establishing commune health centres because such a programme would create severe manpower and pharmaceutical shortages (which in fact they did).'' Mao, on the other hand, as I shall discuss in the next section, saw commune health centres as part of the total effort to reduce rural-urban disparities. In short, while there had been unity of purpose (or at least compatability of purpose) in the 1955-56 attack upon the Ministry, now the Centre was splitting over questions of how rapidly a sub-hsien curative health system should be built.
While not knowing precisely how, if at all, bargains were struck and issues traded off in the Central Committee and the Politburo, all one can unambiguously say is that communes were built in late 1958 and 1959 and that health centres were to be a basic part of each commune's design." Because the central budget could not support all of these centres, it was a foregone conclusion that local financing would be of primary importance. As Li Hsien-nien said: "As for general education, health and medical work ... these are public services which may be run by the masses themselves ... with which the Weishengpu leadership had to deal was the dissatisfaction of the bureaucracy and medical profession. Below this first, outstanding problem was an entire galaxy of difficulties requiring attention. While, as we shall see, Mao believed that one of the greatest difficulties with Ministry work was the under-utilization of resources and under-supply of services, the Weishengpu believed that the pivotal problem was excess demand for services; too many people were entitled to free (kung-fei) or insured (lao-pao) medical care; people took advantage of the system. As one commentator pointed out in the People's Daily: S. . there must be revised certain existing measures which tend to encourage the rural population to infiltrate into the cities, such as subsidies for housing for workers, payment by the state of half of the medical expenses for dependents of workers, and the additional issue of food and cloth ration doctors, researchers and educators unhappily perceived a decline in professional standards. The Ministry leadership, given the training of many of its members, was also distressed. The fact that physicians were unhappy and felt threatened was related to cost problems; as long as doctors were not positively motivated and felt they did not have the support of their superiors, they would not energetically reduce waste in medical facilities. Finally, the Ministry leadership could not envisage any massive expansion of its responsibilities for curative institutions until cost problems were in hand. In short, the Weishengpu was an institution which was unlikely to make bold departures on its own volition. This is not to say that the Ministry was unwilling to " serve the people" but it is clear that the Weishengpu believed that maintenance of quality, good morale and financial solvency were the best way to accomplish that objective. Without good professional morale, quality would decline and cost problems would persist. Without adequate financial resources morale would suffer and quality decline.
Mao Tse-tung and the Nine Man Sub-committee. Mao, in part, attributed public dissatisfaction with past policy to the economic policies pursued in the first Five Year Plan. As early as 1956 " Mao began to advocate balanced development for a plethora of reasons.78 The concentration on heavy industrial development, he claimed, hampered the rural sector in supplying light and heavy industry with raw materials. He feared that unbalanced growth slowed overall economic expansion. Mao concisely summed up his analysis of the situation in 1957 when he said: S . . industry must develop together with agriculture, for only thus can industry secure raw materials and a market and only thus is it possible to accumulate fairly large funds for building a powerful heavy industry. ... As agriculture and light industry develop, heavy industry, assured of its markets and funds, will grow faster. Hence, what may seem to be a slower pace of industrialization will actually not be slow, and indeed may even be faster.79
Even more alarming to the Chairman was the fact that previous patterns of development had been a contributing factor to the discontent evidenced during the "bloom and contend" period. One of the most worrisome defections to Mao was the peasantry. As a New China News Agency release said:
The peasants feel that the government is paying too much attention to the cities. As a result, the workers and the cadres are leading a good life while 77. Mao Tse-tung, " Lun shih ta kuan-hsi" (" On the ten great relationships "), Not only had past developmental policy accentuated urban-rural inequalities, in Mao's view, but also, the previous emphasis on heavy industry had created inequalities among heavy industrial workers and the rest of the urban population. As I noted earlier, no more than 25 per cent of China's urban population was covered for medical costs."81 These intra-urban inequalities had motivated certain workers to attack the Party in the 100 Flowers movement: " Some of the problems involving public mess halls, lavatories, medical clinics, and dormitories which could and should be solved are left unsolved. In the case of those which cannot be solved the reason is not made known to the workers. This is also a source of dissatisfaction among the workers." 82 Another problem stemming from unbalanced economic and social welfare growth was that urban areas functioned as magnets to peasants in the countryside. In 1957 and 1958, the influx was so great that food and housing systems were strained: " The first result is the shortage of housing. .... With the production of cities growing, effects are produced in the supply of goods situation.... The larger the cities grow, the greater the expenditures of the state." 83 All these difficulties were interrelated, from the Chairman's vantage point, and their solution demanded moving towards equalizing the levels of welfare. It was hoped that such equalization could both stop the population pressures in cities from increasing and reduce the alienation which deprived groups felt. Health care was just a part, albeit an important part, of any such equalization programme:
The scale and rate of the development of science, culture, education, public health, and so on, can no longer be entirely the same as originally intended. All must be appropriately expanded and accelerated. . In short, Mao did not think that the solution to China's rural health problems was to be found in the institutional context of the Weishengpu.
To sum up the perceptions and values which Mao and the Nine Man Sub-committee seem to have held, one can say that they were concerned about slow economic growth especially in the agricultural sector, the unequal development of social welfare facilities between urban and rural areas (and within urban areas), and the alienation which was resulting from both of those trends. In this context, Mao and the Nine Man Subcommittee functioned as advocates for the " have-nots " in the developmental process. The fact, however, that Mao and members of the Nine Man Sub-committee viewed the situation in the same general terms does not mean that they all ordered those priorities in the same way, though available data is inadequate to say how specific individuals ordered their objectives.
We must note the characteristics of the rest of the political arena dominated by the Nine Man Sub-committee, namely the provincial and county level Party Committees. The above analysis outlined the intellectual and bureaucratic raison d'etre for the Nine Man Sub-committee, but the sub-committee needed a way to mobilize the millions of peasants; the chosen instruments were the Party Committees at the provincial and county levels. Representatives of these dispersed Party Committees periodically assembled in ad-hoc meetings at which goals were set: " Party committees of hsien level and above must set up leading teams composed of leading cadres from departments of agriculture, health and water conservancy." 88 The importance of choosing this organizational structure to promote mass campaigns is substantial because the middle levels of the Party structure were the most detached from both professional and local (peasant) pressures. In a real sense they were formed by the upwardly mobile cadres who had downplayed the importance of local ties. careers and the lower cadres who are first and foremost local peasants, subject to pressures from their fellows." 9 In the midst of the Great Leap euphoria, and in the absence of professional and local linkages, there was a tendency for middle level cadres to try to achieve high levels of redistribution, even though the " objective " economic situation might have suggested more caution. At this juncture, cadres were evaluated on their ability to transform the countryside and reduce rural-urban inequalities, not on their facility for articulating local peasant "conservatism." Because "free" health care was viewed as a tangible incentive for ever higher levels of collectivization, it was one of the first welfare functions initiated." The hopes that communes could support widespread health activities were not entirely fanciful, at least in late 1958, because the expectation of rapidly increasing agricultural production was confirmed by the bumper harvest of 1958 and the continually rising grain quotas of 1957 and 1958.9" By late 1958, Party leaders at the central and middle levels believed that increased agricultural production and the new commune organization of the countryside changed the entire resources picture of rural China. In sum, then, the commune (in 1958 and 1959) was a political arena in which cadres, with inflated expectations for production and a desire to realize increasingly higher levels of collectivity, pushed for the creation of commune health facilities which would provide " free " medical care. Little thought was given to system-wide manpower and drug availability, to possible discouraging effects,95 or to the long-term financial stability of the system. In fact, there was very little way of co-ordinating the establishment of commune clinics with the educational and pharmaceutical systems run at much higher administrative levels.
While I would like to say more about the specific characteristics of commune political arenas in 1958 and 1959, little data is available on policy processes at this level. The importance of the fact that this arena was dominated by middle level cadres with few local ties is, however, demonstrated by what happened in the 1960-62 period when the structure of the commune political arena was significantly altered. Secondly, to dislodge power further from middle level cadres and to spur production, the " basic accounting unit" was successively moved from the commune to the production brigade, and finally, to the production team. This meant that cadres lower in the administrative and geographic hierarchies gained more power; these were cadres who were much more dependent on their village co-inhabitants than the commune cadres of 1958 and 1959 had been. Once administrative and fiscal power had been decentralized, the number of rural health centres declined and those centres which remained (most of which were the " united clinics " that had existed before 1958) were not, for the most part, collectively financed (or free)."
This slight digression into the 1961-62 period demonstrates that the composition of commune leadership, and the level at which such leadership is exercised, is a crucial determinant of policy. Chinese, at all levels, recognize this fact and much of the struggle over rural health policy has centred around the question of who, with what resources, is to make commune policy. Should it be the commune, the brigade, or the production team? 99 Essentially the same arguments have raged over the control of commune industries and over the allocation of labour.1?0
Conclusion
I have argued in this article that there was no uniformly "radical," "mobilizational " or " mass-orientated " direction to health policy in all of its varied dimensions during the Great Leap Forward. My approach is intended to sensitize the reader to the fact that not all dimensions of any given policy area are made in the same institutional context, by the same leaders, subject to the same constraints, with identical resources. From this proposal, that different issues were " processed " by alternative structures, I went on to discuss whether political bargaining and conflict occurred over the allocation of sub-issues and to examine the strategies by which organizations have sought to acquire and/or hold certain areas of policy responsibility.
As the above propositions would suggest, struggle between organizations has been a continuing feature of health politics in China. The Weishengpu resisted Party usurpation of anti-parasite work in 1955 and 1956, by arguing that untoward results would occur without thorough research and administration. In these years the argument did not carry much weight because the Party Centre was united in its desire to reduce autonomous Ministry-based power. In 1958 and 1959, Ministry arguments for longer medical education at the higher levels, and emphasis upon research, were successful because the Centre itself was split over these questions."' In retrospect, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lu Ting-i all apparently argued for insulation of certain areas of health policy within the Ministry.'02 Experience would suggest, then, that a major strategy which the Ministry of Health can employ is to find supporters for its position at the Centre; this involves the cultivation of personal and bureaucratic ties. In contrast, during the Leap (and in the Cultural Revolution), Mao has shown a propensity to employ the strategy of setting up alternative policy-making arenas (e.g. the Nine Man Sub-committee).
Organizational conflict has occurred not only vertically, that is between the Ministry and the Centre, but also horizontally, that is between the Ministry and equivalent agencies. While much of this conflict is submerged in a sea of rhetoric about unity, occasionally it comes to the surface. One of the recurring conflicts has concerned the level of drug prices. The Ministry has claimed that the level at which the Commercial and Chemical Ministries set drug prices is crucial to its own financial well-being. Quite predictably, the Ministry and subordinate bureaux wanted to keep drug prices as low as possible while, on the other hand, the Chemical and Commercial Ministries argued that drug prices have to be relatively high so that capital accumulation can occur and demand for drugs will stay within tolerable bounds. Organizations not only fight about who is to make policy, but they also fight about who must make policy in certain other areas. The Weishengpu has continually tried to get the industrial ministries to assume some responsibility for industrial health and safety, often to no avail.104 In short, then, some policy issues are fought for and others are avoided. Although we can only see this game dimly, researchers would do well to explore it. This intra-governmental competition for control of issues results, at any given time, in a certain distribution of issues throughout the policymaking system. I am arguing that the distribution of these issues in 1958 and 1959 explains the particular divergences in policy direction which I noted in the first section. Because higher level medical education and medical research policy was kept in an arena dominated by medical professionals, policy change in these areas was different in tone and direction than in the case of commune health care and mass campaigns where middle level political cadres were in charge. Post-Leap policy change occurred because the resources and constraints in the commune and mass campaign arenas changed.
I have described how health policy responsibility resided in several arenas. In administrative terms, we could call this a "divided policymaking system "; functionally related policies were not all made in the same institutional context. In the Nine Man Sub-committee and the 1958-59 commune arenas, the perceptions of middle level cadres were conditioned towards action and producing dramatic results through reliance upon the masses. The major resources were seen as the masses and the Party mobilization structure. Subsequent policies reflected their institutional origin.
In the Weishengpu, a different situation prevailed. Medical doctors (albeit Party members also) were heavily represented at the vice-ministerial and bureau levels. Within the institutional framework of the Ministry of Public Health, each bureau had its own functional area of responsibility and this encouraged specialization and institutional division of labour. The very structure of the Ministry gave urban and professional inputs more weight than rural inputs. Furthermore, the Weishengpu's evaluation of resources reflected its urban location and technical composition.
Various types of policy-making systems have various advantages and disadvantages, and the "divided " system is no exception. The great advantage of this multi-arena system was that it made health policy as a whole more responsive to a broader range of social inputs than the previous Ministry-centred system had been. In the 1958-60 period, provincial, local and commune cadres had substantial influence over anti-parasite policy. In the Weishengpu arena, doctors and researchers had a role in policy formulation. If we are speaking in system " capability" terms, as Almond does,1"5 we would say that the "responsive capacity " of this kind of policy-making system was relatively high.
On the other hand, the " divided policy-making system " had a considerable number of drawbacks, the most important being an inability to co-ordinate. In some senses, the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing. If policy in each arena was to be successful it had to be co-ordinated with policies generated in each of the other policy-making forums. By the very nature of the institutional divisions, however, no regularized channels for co-ordination were operative and the divergent premises, values and leadership of each arena aggravated "natural " institutional divisions. This inability to co-ordinate was most evident in the fact that 24,000 communes were established and yet relatively few planned provisions for increased high level manpower were made, and the drug industry was totally unprepared for the rapid increase in demand for pharmaceuticals. In addition, no regularized procedures were established which would link the mass health campaigns with local health bureaux.
In sum, the "divided policy-making " system maximized inputs into the health policy-making system and minimized the ability to coordinate. I have tried to demonstrate that the "failures" of the Leap did not just arise from a ubiquitous "radical" take-over but, on the contrary, resulted from the very inconsistencies in leadership and programme characteristic of diverse policy-making arenas. 
